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Transition from reciprocal cooperation to persistent
behaviour in social dilemmas at the end
of adolescence
Mario Gutie´rrez-Roig1, Carlos Gracia-La´zaro2, Josep Perello´1, Yamir Moreno2,3,4 & Angel Sa´nchez2,5
While human societies are extraordinarily cooperative in comparison with other social spe-
cies, the question of why we cooperate with unrelated individuals remains open. Here we
report results of a lab-in-the-ﬁeld experiment with people of different ages in a social
dilemma. We ﬁnd that the average amount of cooperativeness is independent of age except
for the elderly, who cooperate more, and a behavioural transition from reciprocal, but more
volatile behaviour to more persistent actions towards the end of adolescence. Although all
ages react to the cooperation received in the previous round, young teenagers mostly respond
to what they see in their neighbourhood regardless of their previous actions. Decisions then
become more predictable through midlife, when the act of cooperating or not is more likely to
be repeated. Our results show that mechanisms such as reciprocity, which is based on
reacting to previous actions, may promote cooperation in general, but its inﬂuence can be
hindered by the ﬂuctuating behaviour in the case of children.
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T
he underlying conﬂict between one’s own beneﬁt and
helping others poses an evolutionary conundrum1 and lies
at the heart of many social dilemmas2. In particular,
human societies are extraordinarily cooperative in comparison
with other social species3–6. The study of this problem has been
addressed in a stylized but insightful manner using the Prisoner’s
Dilemma7,8, arguably the most difﬁcult context for the emergence
of cooperation: individuals are tempted to defect because of greed
(the reward for cheating against a cooperator is the largest payoff
in the game) and of fear (players cheated upon receive the lowest
possible payoff), while mutual cooperation is the most beneﬁcial
outcome in a collective sense. From a theoretical perspective,
several mechanisms have been proposed to explain how
cooperation can arise in such a context9,10. Prominent among
those are kin selection11,12, reciprocity7,13, reputation14 and
different forms of assortment15, including the greenbeard effect16
and the existence of a structure in the population17. Most of these
mechanisms have a wide range of applicability, in which they
successfully allow to understand cooperative behaviour.
Therefore, although there is no general theory of cooperation,
signiﬁcant and promising progress has certainly been made.
From the experimental part, although much work has been
done up to date18, many important issues are yet unresolved or
even unexplored. In particular, whether or not humans’
propensity towards cooperation changes through the life cycle
is a yet-to-answer challenge. This is the focus of our study.
Indeed, a vast majority of experiments conducted up to now
involve volunteers coming from Economics, Psychology or other
academic disciplines, that is, with a high educational level and
typically in the 18- to 25-year-old range (on work with different
types of subjects, see, for example, refs 19 and 20). On the other
hand, although there are many studies examining altruistic
behaviour in children21–23, very little is known about how
cooperative behaviour changes across generations. Indeed, to the
best of our knowledge, there is only one earlier study in which
subjects of different ages were involved in the same experimental
set-up to test their cooperativeness, namely the work by Charness
and Villeval24. They conducted experiments with employees of
two French ﬁrms using junior (under 30) and senior (over 50)
subjects, and on a conventional laboratory set-up with students
and retirees. Their main ﬁnding is that seniors were more
cooperative than juniors, along with some other characteristics
that imply that keeping seniors in the work force may be
beneﬁcial. We will come back to this work, very related to ours on
the old-age range, in the Discussion. A few other lines of work
have investigated the possible decline of decision-making abilities
of older individuals as well as the relation of other social
interaction contexts, such as trust, and age (see, for example,
ref. 24 for references). Among the latter, the paper by Sutter and
Kocher25 will also be relevant for our discussion below.
Here we address the issue of possible age dependences of the
experimentally observed behaviours by conducting a lab-in-the-
ﬁeld experiment, in which volunteers of different ages play
n-player Prisoner’s Dilemmas (PDs). As it has been recently
shown that n-player PDs lead to the same qualitative results when
nZ3 (ref. 26), we focused on the case of the n¼ 4 game. For the
experiments (henceforth referred to as the DAU and School
experiments), subjects were placed in a group with other players
of similar ages (there were seven groups) or in a group with other
participants irrespective of their age (control groups).
Our results show that young teenagers do not have an intrinsic
strategy and that elderly people cooperate more. Speciﬁcally, we
report that there are two transitions in the observed cooperative
level as humans get older: children in the range 10–16 years old
are neither intrinsically cooperators nor defectors, their behaviour
being inﬂuenced by their neighbourhood. In adulthood,
individuals are differentiated and decisions become much more
persistent. Subsequently, cooperativeness increases in the elderly.
Our ﬁndings imply that mechanisms usually invoked to explain
human cooperation are age-independent beyond adolescence and
suggest that speciﬁc strategies should be developed to foster
prosocial behaviour in youth.
Results
Experiments. In a ﬁrst stage, we run an experiment during the
ﬁrst Board Games Fair (DAU Barcelona Festival, http://dau-
barcelona.bcn.cat) in December 2012 (referred to as DAU
experiment). Participants with ages between 10 and 87 were
randomly recruited among visitors of the Festival to play an
iterated four-person PD for 25 rounds (this number was ﬁxed but
unknown to the participants). In order to compare the behaviour
of subjects of different ages, we divided the age range as follows:
10–16, 17–25 (which corresponds to the typical age range in this
sort of experiments) 26–35, 36–45, 46–55, 56–65 and 66 and over.
In addition, the control groups had four participants irrespective
of their age. Table 1 summarizes the main features of these
groups. It is worth stressing that the Festival was more an exhi-
bition and a social event than a convention aimed at attracting
well-trained players. Moreover, volunteers that participated in the
experiment did not know each other and did not show up by
themselves, but we had to make efforts to recruit them, somewhat
diminishing the possibility of self-selection. As shown below, the
youngest group showed a signiﬁcantly distinct behaviour with
respect to the rest of the groups. Therefore, in order to reproduce
the results found for the children, we subsequently carried out a
sequel with the same experimental set-up at the Jesuı¨tes Casp
(Casp Jesuits School, http://www.casp.fje.edu, hereafter referred
to as School experiment), focusing on reproducing the results of
the young teenager group with 53 new subjects between 12 and 13
years old. In Methods, we provide a more detailed description of
the volunteer proﬁle and recruitment at the DAU and School
experiments and the experimental procedure. Full details on the
software and the experiment instructions are included in the
Supplementary Methods.
Average level of cooperation. We begin the report on our results
with the DAU experiment. The overall fraction of cooperative
actions c in each round, averaged over all players (and, therefore,
over all age groups) quickly drops from initial values around 0.65
to values around 0.45 (see Supplementary Fig. 1). This behaviour
is consistent with previous ﬁndings in experiments with humans
playing a PD26. Filled circles in Fig. 1 show the probability of
cooperation—that is, average fraction of cooperative actions—
over the last 15 rounds for the seven groups considered (results
averaging over all rounds are qualitatively similar,
cf. Supplementary Fig. 2). In addition, the horizontal line
represents the observed value for the control group. It is
apparent that the level of cooperation in groups from 17 to 65
years old and the control is quite similar, showing values in the
range of 0.4oco0.47. In contrast, the stationary level of
cooperation, c¼ 0.34, observed in the ﬁrst group—under 17
years old—is signiﬁcantly (P value o10 4, binomial test,
signiﬁcance level 0.001, and sample size 25 times the number of
subjects in each group) lower than the control group, whereas the
cooperation of the last group—over 65 years old—is signiﬁcantly
higher, c¼ 0.55 (P valueo10 4, binomial test, signiﬁcance level
0.001, and sample size 25 times the number of subjects in each
group). It thus follows that, in the DAU experiment, extreme
age groups showed a behaviour clearly distinct from the mid-
aged groups: while children between 10 and 17 years old were
quite uncooperative, the elderly adopted a very cooperative
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behaviour (see Supplementary Table 1 for the results of the null-
hypothesis binomial test).
The observed behaviour for the young teenager group,
impressive as it may look, must be carefully considered. There
are a number of reasons why the cooperation level may be lower
in this group, but prominent among those is that the people
attending the DAU Festival, although it is a board games
exhibition rather than a competition, may be more competitive
than the average individual. The results for the control group and
for the age groups from 17 through 65 years old are consistent
with those reported in similar experiments27–31, abundant in
particular for the 17–25 group. Most adult participants in the
Festival were board game players themselves, so this agreement
might rule out the effects of volunteer competitiveness and, in
fact, it gives even more relevance to the cooperative level of the
elderly players, which we will analyse later on. However, the lack
of reference values for the 10–16 group, and the small number of
participants we had, prompted us to replicate the experiment for
this age segment, which we did with the School experiment. The
results for the average cooperation level in the School experiment
are also shown in Fig. 1 (ﬁlled triangles) and clearly indicate that
the level of cooperation in the young teenager group is not
statistically different from the control or the other groups, neither
for the participants in the School experiment, nor for all
participants at DAU and School pooled together (ﬁlled
squares). Therefore, it can be safely concluded that the average
cooperation level is the same in all the age ranges from 10
through 65 years old. As we shall discuss later on, we believe that
the observed differences between both sets of children arise from
their very same behaviour in front of the dilemma, although we
also acknowledge that they could be rooted in the apparent higher
competitiveness of the DAU children. Finally, considering that
previous studies32 have found evidence on gender differences in
cooperation, and given the lack of cross-generational studies on
this topic, we have tested the existence of a gender dependency of
the behaviour in the different age groups. However, we have not
found signiﬁcant differences in either cooperative levels or
conditional transition probabilities between males and females
in any age group.
Behavioural rules. Notwithstanding, observing no signiﬁcant
differences in the fraction of cooperative actions among children
and mid-aged individuals does not imply that all players,
regardless of their ages, play following the same behavioural rules.
It might well be the case that the strategies followed give rise to
the same average level of cooperation, despite them being distinct.
To shed more light on how people of different ages behave in
social dilemmas, we analysed how the actions changed in relation
to participants’ own choice in the previous round and the
cooperation level they observed in their neighbourhood. This
analysis has proved to be insightful in recent experiments26,29,30,
in which it unveiled an unexpected dependence of the players’
actions on their own previous decision, something that had not
been pointed out before. In addition to this behaviour, termed
moody in the above referenced papers, conditional cooperation,
that is, a dependence of the probability of cooperation on the
number of partners that cooperated in the previous round was
also observed. The speciﬁcs of this dependence may vary from
one experiment to another: while there is often a monotonously
increasing trend (approximately linear) of the probability to
cooperate versus the number of cooperative neighbours of the
focal player in the previous round, it is also common to ﬁnd less
clear dependencies.
Results from such analysis for our experiment are shown in
Fig. 2 for the control (panel a) and the children groups (DAU and
School, panel b). It is immediately apparent from the plot that
control players clearly reproduce the moody pattern, namely, the
dependence of the current decision on the previous action, while
reacting to the context in a not well-deﬁned manner. This is also
the case for all age groups except young teenagers (see
Supplementary Fig. 3). Remarkably, the latter group did not
show any evidence of dependence on their actions on their own
previous one, although they did keep their behaviour conditioned
to the actions they observe, that is, they reciprocate as all other
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Figure 1 | Cooperation by age group. Fraction c of cooperative actions
averaged over the last 15 rounds as a function of the average age of each
group. Filled circles correspond to the DAU experiment, the ﬁlled triangle to
the School experiment and the ﬁlled squares stand for the average value
when all children are considered. The horizontal dashed line shows the value
for the control group. x axis bars cover the age range of the groups divided as
follows: 10–16, 17–25, 26–35, 36–45, 46–55, 56–65 and over 66. y axis error
bars represent the s.d. of a binomial distribution over the size of the age
group and the number of rounds analysed (15).
Table 1 | Age groups.
Age group 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Control School
Average age (years) 12.33 21.10 30.25 39.96 49.54 60.00 72.56 36.75 12.17
Minimum age (years) 10 17 27 36 46 56 66 13 12
Maximum age (years) 16 27 35 45 55 65 87 57 13
Number of subjects 24 16 20 24 24 12 20 24 52
Number of games 6 4 5 6 6 3 5 6 13
Rounds playing C 1.50 2.36 3.11 2.15 2.92 2.80 3.68 2.92 1.72
Rounds playing D 2.51 2.62 3.55 2.81 2.72 3.20 2.75 3.24 2.02
The players’ pool was classiﬁed into nine different groups according to the age of the participants, including two for the children (one in the DAU experiment and another in the School experiment) and a
control group. Each of these groups were in turn divided into subsets of four subjects who played among them. Note that the last two entries of the Table refer to the average number of rounds a given
strategy was played sequentially, that is, the average length of a C or D chain.
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age groups. The only exception to this behaviour comes when no
partner cooperated, and in this situation our ﬁndings indicate
that young teenagers tend to use an alternating strategy between
the two actions.
Further evidence of the previous behaviour is provided in
Fig. 3, where we show the measured conditional transition rates
that a player cooperates following a cooperative action, p(C|C) or
after defecting, p(C|D). These two quantities are markedly
different for all groups except for the children—note that
irrespective of them being from the DAU or the School
experiments results are roughly the same—an observation that
conﬁrms our previous statements regarding the noticeable
behavioural differences between the youths and the rest of
players. We observe, ﬁrst, that the behaviour of the participants
aged above 17 is statistically indistinguishable from that of the
control group, and, second, that the probability to cooperate
following a cooperation is more than twice that following a
defection. This substantial difference between the two conditional
probabilities is completely absent in the case of children: they
have the largest transition rate to defection after they have
cooperated and the smaller permanence probability as coopera-
tors if they did so in the previous round. Indeed, computing the
average number of rounds that an individual plays as a
cooperator or as a defector sequentially, one ﬁnds that children
have the shortest cooperative chain, see Table 1. In addition, this
happens in the two sets of players analysed, which suggests that
the observed difference in the average cooperation level of the two
groups of children (noticeable in Fig. 1) should arise from the
initial fraction of cooperators in the ﬁrst rounds—as teenagers
mostly reciprocate what they observe in their neighbourhood in
spite of their previous action, differences in the level of
cooperation at the very ﬁrst stages will propagate in a sort of
feedback till the last round.
Altogether, the previous result for the youth indicates that
children are inconstant in their decisions, as they are almost
equally likely to repeat the last action and to change it, with
defection being slightly more probable. Interestingly, this implies
that children behave in a manner that may lead to cooperation
breakdown or at least to its decrease, as they are not reliable
partners and they may in consequence assume that their partners
are not reliable as well, thus making it impossible to establish a
stable cooperative scenario that ultimately could sustain long-
term cooperation. Furthermore, the results in Figs 2 and 3
together discard the possibility that children play randomly. If
this was the case, they would play the same way whatever the level
of cooperation in their neighbourhood were, but Fig. 2b shows
that they are inﬂuenced by what they observe: the larger the
number of cooperators in their group, the larger the probability of
playing as cooperators.
The conditional transition rates also provide hints on the larger
cooperativeness of the elderly. Albeit not statistically signiﬁcant
(see Supplementary Table 2), the results in Fig. 3 suggest that in
this group the probabilities to cooperate may be the largest in all
groups. In particular, the fact that p(C|C) is very large leads to
very long sequences playing as cooperators. Indeed, as seen in
Table 1, the elderly show the largest average cooperative chain of
all groups, more than two times the average length of the C
sequences in children. In turn, the estimated conditional
probabilities can be used to inform a Markov chain model that
predicts the probability of permanence of a given action for at
least n rounds. Such a model ﬁts accurately the experimental
observations, as seen in Supplementary Fig. 4. Furthermore, we
can also estimate the total probability of cooperation: using Bayes’
theorem one has that p(D|C)p(C)¼ p(C|D)p(D), which, taking
into account the normalization condition p(D)¼ 1 p(C), yields
for the probability of cooperation
pðCÞ¼ pðC jDÞ
pðD jCÞþ pðC jDÞ : ð1Þ
Supplementary Fig. 5 compares the prediction to the observed
result, showing again a very good agreement (see also the null-
hypothesis test shown in Supplementary Table 3). This Markov
chain model allows us to draw another, most relevant conclusion:
one-step memory is enough to explain the actions of the players
in n-player PD (in agreement with the statistical analysis
presented in ref. 26). The model has also allowed to compute
the proﬁt’s distribution, see Supplementary Fig. 6 and
Supplementary Table 4.
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Figure 2 | Behaviour dependence on the cooperation context in the previous round. Empirical probabilities of cooperating after playing C or D,
conditioned to the context (number of cooperators in the previous round) for the control sample (a) and for all children in DAU and School experiments
pooled together (b), computed over all the rounds (25) of the experiment. Children show a different behaviour as compared with the rest of the groups,
namely, their decisions to cooperate or defect do not seem to depend on their own actions in the previous round. The error bars represent one s.d. of a
binomial distribution for a simple size equal to the number of times each context appeared.
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Discussion
The ﬁndings of this study represent an important step towards a
more comprehensive understanding of cooperation in humans. In
particular, our experiment has a number of important implica-
tions regarding the evolution of cooperation from childhood to
the elderly. The most relevant ﬁndings concern the clear
differences found between children and the rest of groups and
the high cooperation showed by the elderly. As for the teenagers,
the observed distinct behaviour might be due to the unsophis-
ticated development of social values in children21 with respect to
adult subjects33. Admittedly, children have not fully developed
cognitive and strategic abilities related to social and moral
implications, such as ethics, morality, collective fairness and
cooperation. They are at a stage in which they realize that rules
are not rigid and are formed by mutual consent for reasons of
fairness and equity and hence that these rules can be changed as
the need arises. Therefore, when they meet their peers, they adopt
a strategy that essentially looks for a kind of social equality,
mostly reciprocating the behaviour they observe. In other words,
they are not intrinsically cooperators nor defectors and
implement those strategies that they believe will allow them to
beneﬁt more in return or based on the principle of what is good
for others is also good for me. Interestingly, as shown in
Supplementary Fig. 6 and Supplementary Table 4, their behaviour
backﬁres: they earn less than the other age groups, and their proﬁt
distribution is much less scattered. Conversely, mid-aged
individuals and the elderly base their decisions on what people
around them do and use simple heuristics, reacting to the context
of cooperation they observe and attempting to keep their previous
action, to some extent, to decide whether or not to cooperate.
Given the relevance of our results, it is important to discuss
possible caveats about them. A ﬁrst relevant point is the sample
size, which admittedly is not very big, except for the young
teenagers, thanks to our second experiment. During the fair at
DAU we recruited as many people as we could but, particularly
for the higher ages, we could not do much better because not so
many senior citizens attended or were willing to take part in the
experiment. However, we stress that the number of individuals we
ﬁnally had is statistically signiﬁcant and, in any case, like any
other experimental work, it would be of the utmost importance to
have this one replicated with a larger sample size in order to
conﬁrm our results. Regarding our pool of subjects, self-selection
problems might also be a concern in so far as the ﬁeld experiment
was carried out with people attending a board game fair. As we
discussed in the Introduction, we believe that this inﬂuence is
compensated in part by the fact that people do not spontaneously
volunteer to take part in our experiment, and we did have to
persuade them to come in, often laboriously.
Another important point we have to consider relates to possible
cohort effects, as they can affect developmental inferences as the
ones we are drawing here. It is clear that people above 65 have
experienced very different environments than people below 18. In
Spain, the major change in recent times happened in the years
1975–1981, that is, during the transition from Franco’s dictatorship
to a democratic state34. It is not unreasonable to expect that, due to
such a remarkable event, differences between people above and
below 40 years arise; notwithstanding, we do not observe anything
noticeable in that range of age. Cohort effects may arise also from
different education systems. Unfortunately, Spain has had seven
education laws and programmes in the last 30 years, so it is very
difﬁcult to grasp what the effects of this can be. In any event, the
fact that there is not much difference in most of the affected range
suggests that cohort effects arising from this cause are not very
important. Generally speaking, we do not believe that cohort
effects are affecting our results much, although we cannot possibly
exclude them.
On the other hand, our key ﬁnding, the volatile behaviour
observed in young teenagers, has been checked with the School
experiment, in which there is no self-selection beyond possible
socioeconomic effects. We do not have data to study those in our
sample; however, semi-private schools in Spain such as Jesuı¨tes
Casp are neither exclusive nor prohibitively expensive, and their
students come from a wide range of middle class families, with
only the poor (the School itself, jointly with parents has a collective
fund for those families with ﬁnancial problems) or the very rich
excluded. The relative size of the rewards compared with the
typical income of the different age groups could also play a role
here, something that could be controlled by adjusting the reward
size. However, as discussed in ref. 25, estimating income is very
difﬁcult when dealing with such a wide age range, and therefore we
decided to stick to the principle of using the same set-up for all
subjects. In any event, experimental results9,35 on trust games
suggest that income effects are not very important (see also ref. 18;
see ref. 36 for evidence of socioeconomic inﬂuence on younger
children behaviour in a dictator game). Therefore, while, as we
have just seen, there is room for alternative explanations of our
results other than particularities of young teenagers, we believe that
none of them is very likely to affect our ﬁndings signiﬁcantly. The
general agreement of our results with those of Charness and
Villeval24 reinforces this conclusion.
Finally, a last possible caveat relates to our choice of school for
the second experiment. Being run by the Jesuit order, it is in
principle a religious (Catholic) school, and it has been argued
(see, for example, refs 37, 38) that religious people are more
cooperative. Two comments are in order in this regard. On one
hand, at ﬁrst-year ESO classes (children in their ﬁrst year in high
school) there are students of chinese origin, Muslims, Christians
and, in general, believers and non-believers. Among teachers,
there are also agnostic and atheist ones. School teachers intend to
transmit them the idea that being good people has nothing to do
with any speciﬁc religion. Not all students take Christian religion
classes, neither are they mandatory; the only mandatory subject is
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Figure 3 | Children exhibit the same cooperation probability following a
cooperative or a defective act. Experimentally measured probability to
cooperate following a cooperation p(C|C) (ﬁlled squares) or a defection
p(C|D) (ﬁlled circles) for each age group computed over all the rounds (25)
of the experiment. For the young teenager group, the ﬁlled symbols
correspond to the DAU experiment, and the empty symbols to the School
experiment. The error bars represent the s.d. of each probability over the
different age groups. The sample size for the statistical analysis is equal the
number of times each context appeared. Lines correspond to control group
results jointly with their s.d.
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a general one on religions, including even pre-religion beliefs.
There are three Catholic masses yearly, where attendance is not
mandatory for students or teachers, and where the priest makes
an effort to speak for a general audience, even for atheists,
focusing on common values. In addition, a poll made among the
students’ parents makes it clear that the religious character of the
school is not at all the main motivation for parents to choose it,
conﬁrming that there is not a special religiosity among the school
attendance. Finally, in terms of family situations, this general
population shows also in the fact that the school has students who
live in all types of family environments, from the traditional ones
to single parenthood, homosexual parenthood, divorced parents,
and so on. Given this proﬁle, it is not to be expected that our
subjects are specially religious, although, as we have already
clariﬁed, even then their behaviour is exactly the same as we
observed in DAU, leaving aside their slightly higher level of
cooperation. On the other hand, assuming that indeed the
religious character of the school explains the larger
cooperativeness of the subjects in our second experiment, it is
important to realize that this does not affect our main conclusion,
namely their reciprocal behaviour, which is equally observed in
both samples. Therefore, we are conﬁdent that our choice of
school does not exert any inﬂuence on our results and
conclusions.
Ultimately, our conclusions aligns with previous claims about
the existence of a developmental transition in humans over time
regarding empathy39 and quantitatively shows that the same shift
takes place when humans are faced with social dilemmas, with a
strategic change from a response to others’ actions to a more
sophisticated moody (also prosocial) conditional behaviour. This
ﬁnding, obtained by having subjects in a very wide range of ages
participating in the same experiment, adds to observations of how
altruistic or reciprocal behaviour develops in early childhood22,23.
It thus seems possible that, as cooperative behaviour increases with
age below 10 years, most likely due to the development
of a theory of mind, the same theory of mind might give rise to
a period in life in which children’s behaviour is characterized
by their ﬂexibility and ability to compromise and change rules
as required. This hypothesis could also be related to the transition
in trust and trustworthiness observed by Sutton and Kocher25 (see
also ref. 40) and to the observed behaviour of children 6- to 12-
years old in public goods and dictator experiments41, very different
from that of older children and adults as they increase in later
rounds of the experiment. The decrease in spitefulness in the same
age range42 and the increasing inequality acceptance43 are further
hints about such a key developmental transition.
Moreover, our results imply that mechanisms such as reputation
and reciprocity, that are based on social perception, might be
universal for humans, that is, they are not relative to the age of the
individuals. However, their impact on the long-term stability of
cooperation might be hindered by the inconstant behaviour in the
case of children. At the same time, the large age range in which
individuals exhibit similar behaviour allows to generalize observa-
tions with the usual experimental subjects. Thus, recent experi-
ments showing that population structure do not support human
cooperation in PDs29,30 should indeed be reproducible with
subjects aged 17 through 65 years. The inconstant behaviour of
young teenagers would also lead to the lack of cooperation in a
network setting, albeit for different reasons.
Our results on the two age groups that behave differently have
several policy implications. First, they suggest that, on the side of
teenagers, speciﬁc strategies should be developed to promote a
transition to a more persistent prosocial behaviour and to help
them understand the need for some perseverance. Second, the
susceptibility of children’s behaviour to what they see in their
environment regardless of their own previous choices points to the
fact that their future moral and strategic thinking could be
conditioned to the education they have received. Finally, as
suggested previously, fostering the participation of older individuals
in the key social decisions or collective negotiations33 and keeping
them longer in the workforce24 may be judicious procedures.
Methods
Ethics statement. All participants in the experiments reported in the manuscript
signed an informed consent to participate. Besides, their anonymity was always
preserved (in agreement with the Spanish Law for Personal Data Protection) by
assigning them randomly a username that would identify them in the system. No
association was ever made between their real names and the results. As it is
standard in socioeconomic experiments, no ethical concerns are involved other
than preserving the anonymity of participants. This procedure was checked and
approved by the Viceprovost of Research of Universidad Carlos III de Madrid, the
institution responsible for the funding for the experiment.
Experiment at DAU. The experiment was carried out with 168 volunteers selected
from the attendants to DAU Barcelona Festival 2012 (ﬁrst Board Game Fair of
Barcelona, December 15 and 16). During the recruitment process, the experiment
was referred to as a social experiment and nobody knew in advance what the
experiment was about. Following the call for participation, we selected the 168
volunteers regarding age distribution criteria, with 82 males and 86 females
representing the 48.81% and 51.19% of the total number of players, respectively. In
order to satisfy ethical procedures, all personal data about the participants were
anonymized and treated as conﬁdential.
For every age range, and for the control treatment in which people played
together irrespectively of their ages, there were six groups, except for the 17–25
range (ﬁve groups), the 56–64 range (three groups) and the over 66 range (four
groups). Speciﬁcally, the volunteers’ set was divided into 42 subsets of four players
according to the age distribution shown in Table 1. Control subsets constitute
samples with a heterogeneous distribution of ages. Each subset of four volunteers
made up a game, that is, every player had partners of his own age range (except in
the control subsets) playing everyone against everyone.
All the volunteers played via a web interface speciﬁcally created for the
experiment (see below) that was accessible through the computers available in the
room. At least three researchers supervised the experiment in the room (which had
a maximum capacity of 12 players), preventing any interaction among the
volunteers. They were not allowed to talk or signal in any way. To further
guarantee that potential interactions among players seating next to each other in
the room do not inﬂuence the results of the experiment, the assignment of players
to the different computers of the room was completely random. Hence, physical
neighbours do not necessarily correspond with game partners. In addition, as
described below, the colours used to code the two available actions of the game
were also selected randomly, further decreasing the likelihood that neighbouring
participants could inﬂuence each other.
Volunteers played a 2 2 PD game with each of their three neighbours,
choosing the same action, either to cooperate (C) or to defect (D), for all
opponents. The experiment was conducted using a slightly modiﬁed version of a
software that was previously used in another, although larger, experiment30.
Volunteers were allowed to choose language between Spanish or Catalan. Upon
accessing the software, participants entered the directions for the experiment
(detailed information is provided in the Supplementary Information, see also
Supplementary Figs 7–9). When every participant of the group ﬁnished reading,
the experiment begun, lasting for 25 rounds (participants were not aware of the
number of rounds). After completing the experiment, participants were asked to ﬁll
a short questionnaire and then proceed to a separate part of the room where they
received their payments. Volunteers under the legal age played the game by
themselves while their guardians waited outside the room and received their
payments with the approval and surveillance of their guardians. The overall average
payment was 15.12 euros including a 5 euro show-up fee. Total earnings in the
experiment ranged from 3.80 to 27.95 euros.
Experiment at jesuı¨tes. Jesuı¨tes Casp is located in the city centre of Barcelona.
Jesuı¨tes is part of a school network of seven semi-private centres, most of them
located in neighbourhoods of the city of Barcelona. Jesuı¨tes Casp students have a
very diverse proﬁle: it is a large school with about 1,200 students from 6 to 18 years
old. Each grade has ﬁve class groups.
The experimental set-up followed the same rules as in the case of the
experiment at DAU. The same web interface was used and an identical game was
played. The experiment was performed on 4 March 2014. However, volunteers
participated in a different way. On the basis of the DAU results, we decided to
focus on a large group of teenagers between 12 and 13 years old. Young teenagers
were from ﬁrst year of ESO (Compulsory Secondary School) and from two
different class groups (ESO 1-A and ESO 1-E). The teenagers only knew in advance
that they were going to participate in a scientiﬁc experiment during a one hour
class but they were not aware of any detail about the speciﬁcs of the experiment.
The students’ parents were informed of the participation of their children in the
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experiment and explicitly authorized it. This hour class typically divides these two
classes of 26 and 27 pupils, into two different subgroups; in this way, we had groups
of 14 and 13 teenagers in four different rooms and split in a random way. Note
that, as we played a four-people game, one student did not ﬁt in any group and was
set to play against computer robots without informing him in order to avoid
leaving any of them out; however, the corresponding data have been ignored in the
analysis. They did not know who their partners were, and we made sure that each
player in each game was placed in a different room. In each room, one member of
the research team and one teacher supervised the evolution of the experiment. The
experiment was carried out with 27 males and 26 females representing 51% and
49% of the total number of volunteers, respectively. The average proﬁt for each
participant was 14.89 euros. Total earnings ranged from 9.25 euros to 19.45 euros
and volunteers were informed about their own proﬁt right after ﬁnishing the
experiment. Payments were issued in the form of checks valid at a bookstore, which
also sells school materials and educational toys, located at 5-min walking distance
from Jesuı¨tes Casp. The checks were delivered to volunteers by the school teachers
a couple of weeks after the experiment when parent’s signatures in check receipt
were collected.
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